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Abstract. Biometric authentication is becoming increasingly popular
as a convenient authentication method. However, the privacy and se-
curity issues associated with biometric authentication are very serious.
Privacy-preserving biometric authentication addresses privacy concerns
associated with the use of biometrics and offers a secure solution for
user authentication. Given the tremendous expansion of wireless commu-
nications a new distributed architecture in biometric authentication is
evolving. In this distributed setting, a resource constrained client may
outsource part of the computations during the biometric authentication
process to a more powerful device (cloud server). In this work, we consider
one such distributed setting consisting of clients, a cloud server, and a
service provider and make a case for the need for verifiable computation
to achieve security against malicious, as opposed to an honest-but-curious,
cloud server. In particular, we propose to use verifiable computation on
top of an homomorphic encryption scheme to verify that the cloud server
correctly performs the computations outsourced to it. A proof of security
of a generic protocol in the presence of a malicious cloud server is also
provided. Finally, we discuss how an XOR-linear message authentication
code can be used to verify the correctness of the computation.
Key words: Biometric authentication, biometric template privacy, ho-
momorphic encryption, verifiable computation, XOR-linear MAC.
1 Introduction
The new era of ubiquitous computing has led to mobile biometric au-
thentication in which resource constrained devices are involved in the
authentication process. More precisely, in this setting the client gains
access to the authentication system via a wireless resource constrained
device (e.g., mobile phone) and part of computations involved in the
authentication process are outsourced to more powerful devices (cloud
servers). Although this distributed setting seems to be quite natural given
the tremendous expansion of wireless communications and cloud comput-
ing, it also poses serious security and privacy concerns, since biometrics
may reveal sensitive private information and could be used to profile and
track individuals. In order to protect against such privacy threats, it is
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important to employ privacy-preserving techniques suitable for distributed
settings such as secure multi-party computation techniques.
By adopting a distributed model of internal entities in the biometric
authentication process one can limit the amount of power each single
protocol entity has at its disposal and consequently avoid single point of
failure attacks [1]. Additionally, such separation of protocol entities ensures
higher degree of privacy for the biometric data since not a single entity has
access to all sensitive data (i.e., fresh biometric template, stored biometric
template, user’s identity). However, an important problem that rises when
part of the computations of the biometric authentication process are
outsourced to cloud servers is how to guarantee the confidentiality of the
outsourced data as well as the correctness of the outsourced computation.
A malicious cloud server could indeed modify the process in order to gain
some advantages, for instance, to reduce the cost of computation or recover
private information. In this paper, we treat such cases of malicious cloud
server and make a case for the need for combining privacy-preserving
biometric authentication with verifiable delegation of computation to
protect the privacy of the biometric templates against the cloud.
Biometric authentication comprises of two phases: the enrollment phase
and the authentication phase. In the enrollment phase, users provide their
biometric templates derived from their biometrics (such as fingerprints, face
recognition and iris scan) for storage in a database. In the authentication
phase, users authenticate themselves by providing their fresh biometric
templates, and they are authenticated if their fresh biometric template
matches the reference biometric template stored in the database.
Following the previous work by [2,3], we consider the following setting
for a biometric authentication system comprising three entities, namely,
a client set C of clients Ci, for i “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , N , one for each user Ui, a
computation (or a cloud) server CS with a database DB, and a service
provider SP . The client Ci has a sensor that captures biometric templates
from its owner (i.e., the user Ui). The cloud server CS stores the reference
biometric templates and performs computationally expensive calculations.
The service provider SP takes the final decision depending on whether
there is a match between the fresh and the reference biometric templates.
This is a reasonable model considering the fast rise of cloud computing
and storage services, and also the widespread use of smartphones with
embedded biometric sensors.
A common cryptographic tool that is employed in building privacy-
preserving biometric authentication is homomorphic encryption [1–7]. In
such a scheme, encryption protects the privacy of the biometric templates
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while the matching of the fresh and reference biometric templates are
performed over the encrypted data using the homomorphic property of
the encryption. However, this requires the actor responsible for performing
the delegated calculations on encrypted biometric templates to be trusted.
Otherwise, by computing a function different than what the protocol
specifies and using SP as an oracle, the computing actor (i.e., the CS) can
learn information about either the stored reference biometric template
bi or the fresh biometric template b
1
i. Similar attacks on two recently
proposed protocols employing ring-LWE and ideal lattice based somewhat
homomorphic encryption schemes [2, 3] are presented in [8]. Therefore, in
addition to homomorphic encryption, a cryptographic scheme that allows
the client/service provider to verify that the cloud server performed the
correct computation. Schemes that allow verification of computations
delegated to a computationally powerful third party (or the cloud server
in our case) already exist and are known as verifiable computation [9–14]
or signatures of correct computation [15]. In this paper, we study their
employment in privacy-preserving biometric authentication.
1.1 Related work.
Over the years, quite a few proposals for privacy-preserving biometric
authentication appeared in the literature. These are based upon crypto-
graphic techniques, such as blivious transfer [16,17], private information
retrieval [18, 19], and homomorphic encryption [20, 21]. For example,
Bringer et al. employed the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem [21] to pro-
tect the privacy of the biometric templates against honest-but-curious
(or passive) adversaries in [1]. There are also other privacy-preserving
biometric authentication protocols that are based on the additive HE by
Paillier [20] and Damg˚ard et al. [22] such as the protocols for face recogni-
tion in [5–7]. Oblivious transfer was used in SCiFi [23], a system for secure
computation of face identification. Furthermore, somewhat HE schemes
based on ideal lattices and ring learning with errors are also employed in
designing privacy-preserving biometric authentication protocols in [2, 3].
All of these protocols are designed to be secure against honest-but-
curious adversaries, and their security and privacy properties are later
analysed in [4, 8, 24–26]. In [24], Simoens et al. made a compelling case
for the need for designing privacy-preserving biometric authentication
protocols that are secure against malicious adversaries. They also presented
a framework for analysing the security and privacy-preserving properties of
biometric authentication protocols in the presence of such adversaries. In
fact, the weaknesses of the protocols proposed in [1–3] that are identified
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in [8, 25, 26] can be attributed to the lack of verifiable computation. In
other words, the attacks reported in [8, 25,26] can also be mitigated using
verifiable computation.
Since most biometric authentication schemes use binary biometric
templates, the Hamming distance (or the normalised Hamming distance)
is employed to check whether two biometric templates match each other.
Therefore, protocols for secure Hamming distance computation based on
oblivious transfer are proposed by Bringer, Chabanne and Patey in [27].
These protocols have potential applications in privacy-preserving biometric
authentication. Recently Bringer et al. generalised their results for secure
computation of other distances such as the Euclidean and the normalised
Hamming distance in [28].
1.2 Our contribution.
In this paper, we propose to combine verifiable computation with homomor-
phic encryption in order to achieve security against malicious computing
server (i.e., the cloud server) in the above mentioned distributed biometric
authentication setting. To this end, we outline a generic biometric authen-
tication protocol with enhanced security and privacy properties in the
presence of a malicious cloud server, combining homomorphic encryption
with a scheme for verifiable computation. We then prove the security
of the generic protocol against malicious cloud server. Furthermore, we
discuss how an XOR-linear message authentication code (MAC) can be
used to verify the correctness of the outsourced computation in the studied
biometric authentication setting.
Outline. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the necessary background. Section 3 presents our threat model and
communication model for the protocol. Next we propose a generic protocol
combining a scheme for verifiable computation with HE, and show that
the protocol has enhanced security and privacy properties even in the
presence of a malicious cloud server in Section 4. Furthermore, we give a
specific instantiation of our generic protocol using an XOR-linear MAC in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
First, we introduce the notations used in this paper. Biometric templates
are regarded as vectors in ZNqě2, where q is an integer. Let bi and b1i
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denote the reference and fresh biometric templates, respectively, of the
i-th user Ui whose identity is denoted by IDi, for i “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,M , where M
is the total number of users. Let τ be the authentication threshold and
Dist : ZMq ˆ ZMq ÞÑ Rě0 be a distance on ZMq . Then we say that bi and
b1i match each other and thus belong to the same user, if Distpbi, b1iq ď τ .
In the case of binary templates, the Hamming distance between bi and
b1i is denoted by HDpbi, b1iq, which is also equal to the Hamming weight
HWpbi ‘ b1iq. Finally, PPT and IND-CPA refer to probabilistic polynomial
time and indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks, respectively.
2.1 Homomorphic encryption
We use an homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme, denoted by HE “
pKeyGen,Enc,Decq, that allows, given Encpbiq and Encpb1iq, to compute
EncpDistpbi, b1iqq homomorphically. We require the employed HE scheme to
have semantic security against chosen plaintext attacks, which is defined
as follows. Let ppk, skq be the public and private key pairs for the HE
scheme and λ a security parameter. Consider the following game played
between a PPT adversary A and a challenger
ExpIND-CPAHE,A pλq:
ppk, skq, Ð KeyGenpλq; pm0,m1q, m0 ‰ m1 Ð Apλ, pkq; β RÐÝ t0, 1u
c Ð Encpmβ , pkq; β1 Ð Apm0,m1, c, pkq
Return 1 if β1 “ β, 0 otherwise
and define the adversary’s advantage in this game as AdvIND-CPAHE,A pλq “ˇˇ
2 Pr
 
ExpIND-CPAHE,A pλq “ 1
(´ 1ˇˇ.
Definition 1. We say that HE is IND-CPA-secure if all PPT adversaries
have a negligible advantage in the above game: AdvIND-CPAHE,A pλq ď neglpλq.
Here, neglpλq is a negligible function defined as follows.
Definition 2. We say that a function negl : N ÞÑ r0, 1s is negligible if
for all positive polynomials poly and all sufficiently large λ P N, we have
neglpλq ă 1{polypλq.
2.2 Privacy-preserving biometric authentication
At a high level, a privacy-preserving biometric authentication (PPBA)
protocol employing HE can be defined by the following processes.
– Setup: In this step, the keys ppk, skq for the HE scheme are generated
and distributed to the relevant protocol actors by either one protocol
actor or an external trusted third party.
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– DB Ð Enroll`pEncpbiqqMi“1, pIDiqMi“1˘: This process collects the encrypted
reference biometric template Encpbiq and identity IDi pair from all M
users and stores them in the database DB.
– 1Y 0 Ð AuthenpEncpb1iq, IDiq: To authenticate a user Ui, this process
takes an encrypted fresh biometric template Encpb1iq and a claimed
identity IDi, retrieves Encpbiq from the database DB, and homomorphi-
cally computes Distpbi, b1iq from Encpbiq and Encpb1iq. Finally, it outputs
1 if the authentication is successful, 0 otherwise.
A PPBA protocol must be both correct and secure.
Definition 3. We say that a PPBA protocol is correct if, for all enrolled
user identities IDi with the corresponding reference biometric templates bi,
and for all fresh biometric templates b1i with Distpbi, b1iq ď τ , it is always
the case that 1 Ð AuthenpEncpb1iq, IDiq.
One may argue that one can set the Authen process to always return 1
and thus violate the correctness. However, the Authen process described
here is just an abstraction for the verification process of a biometric
authentication protocol, so for it to return 1, the fresh biometric template
must match the reference biometric template.
Informally, a PPBA protocol is secure if a malicious adversary, which
in our case is the cloud server, cannot learn more about the biometric
templates than what is already revealed by the protocol transcripts. For-
mally, we define the security of against a malicious adversary A as follows.
Consider the following game
ExpPrivPPBA,Apλq:
ppk, skq Ð KeyGenpλq; pIDi, b1i0 , b1i1 q, b1i0 ‰ b1i1 Ð Apλ, pkq
β
RÐÝ t0, 1u; Out Ð Authen`IDi,Encpb1iβ q˘
β1 Ð A`IDi, b1i0 , b1i1 ,Encpb1iβ ,DBq,Out˘
Return 1 if β1 “ β, 0 otherwise
and define the adversary’s advantage in this game as AdvPrivPPBA,Apλq “ˇˇ
2 PrtExpPrivPPBA,Apλq “ 1u´1
ˇˇ
. Note, IDi has to be an enrolled user identity.
Definition 4. We say that a PPBA protocol is secure if all PPT adver-
saries have a negligible advantage in the above game: AdvPrivPPBA,Apλq ď
neglpλq.
We assume that the adversary is given an oracle access to Authen and
is allowed to query it with user IDjp‰ IDiq and b1j polynomially many
times (e.g., polypλq times). The adversary is also given Encpb1iβ q and the
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database. If the adversary cannot distinguish whether it is pIDi, b1i0q orpIDi, b1i1q that is being used by Authen, then we say that the protocol
preserves privacy of the biometric templates.
2.3 Verifiable computation
A scheme for verifiable computation (VC) allows a computationally weak
client to both outsource heavy computations to a computationally powerful
cloud server and efficiently verify the output of the cloud server. In our
case, we consider that the heavy computations outsourced by the client
to the cloud server are performed over encrypted data. In particular,
the cloud computes a function f on input Encpbiq and Encpb1iq so that
fpEncpbiq,Encpb1iqq “ EncpDistpbi, b1iqq.
Definition 5 (Verifiable computation [11]). A VC scheme VC “
pKeyGen,ProbGen,Com,Verq comprises four algorithms defined as:
– pPK,VKq Ð KeyGenpλ, fq: The (randomised) key generation algorithm
KeyGen takes as input a security parameter λ and a function f , and
outputs a public key PK and a verification key VK for the function f .
The public key PK is provided to the cloud server, while the verification
key VK is kept secret by the client.
– pσx, ρxq Ð ProbGenpx,VKq: The problem generation algorithm ProbGen
takes as input a function input x and a verification key VK, and outputs
a public value σx and a secret value ρx. The public value σx is provided
to the cloud, while the secret value ρx is kept secret by the client.
– σy Ð Compσx,PKq: The computation algorithm Com takes as input a
public value σx and a public key PK for f , and outputs an encoded
version σy of y “ fpxq.
– yY KÐ Verpρx, σy,VKq: The verification algorithm Ver takes as input
a verification key VK, a secret value ρx, and the output from Com,
and outputs y indicating that σy is a valid encoding of y “ fpxq or K
indicating that σy does not represent fpxq.
A VC scheme is correct if the output of the problem generation
algorithm ProbGen allows an honest cloud server to compute values that
will be successfully verified and that correspond to the evaluation of f on
the input values. Formally, correctness is defined as follows.
Definition 6. A VC scheme VC is said to be correct if, for any function
f and input x in the domain of f , it holds that y Ð Verpρx, σy,VKq
as long as pPK,VKq Ð KeyGenpλ, fq, pσx, ρxq Ð ProbGenpx,VKq, and
σy Ð Compσx,PKq.
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In order to be secure, a VC scheme VC must be such that, for any
given function f and input x, a malicious cloud should not be able to make
the verification algorithm accept y1 such that y1 ‰ fpxq. Formally, the
security of VC is defined as the advantage of an adversary in the following
game ExpVC,Apλ, fq which captures the intuitive argument above.
ExpVC,Apλ, fq:
pPK,VKq Ð KeyGenpλ, fq
x1 Ð Apλ,PKq
pσx1 , ρx1 q Ð ProbGenpx1,VKq
σy1 Ð ApPK, x1, σx1 q
β1 Ð Verpρx1 , σy1 ,VKq
For i “ 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , ` “ polypλq
xi Ð ApPK, x1, σx1 , β1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xi´1, σxi´1 , βi´1qpσxi , ρxi q Ð ProbGenpxi,VKq
σyi Ð ApPK, x1, σx1 , β1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xi´1, σxi´1 , βi´1, σxi q
βi Ð Verpρxi , σyi ,VKq
x Ð ApPK, x1, σx1 , β1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , x`, σx` , β`qpσx, ρxq Ð ProbGenpx,VKq
σ1y Ð ApPK, x1, σx1 , β1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , x`, σx` , β`, σxq
y1 Ð Verpρx, σ1y ,VKq
Return 1 if y1 ‰ fpxq and y1 ‰K, 0 otherwise.
The adversary’s advantage in this game is defined as AdvVC,Apλ, fq “
Pr
 
ExpVC,Apλ, fq “ 1
(
. Note that the adversary is given an oracle access
to ProbGen and Ver.
Definition 7 (Security of VC [11]). We say that VC is secure if, for
any function f , all PPT adversaries have a negligible advantage in the
above game: AdvVC,Apλ, fq ď neglpλq.
3 Threat model
When analysing the security of a protocol, there are two types of adversaries
to consider: a semi-honest (also known as, honest-but-curious or passive)
adversary and a malicious (or active) adversary. A semi-honest adversary
follows the protocol correctly, but attempts to deduce as much information
as possible about protected data from the protocol transcripts. A malicious
adversary, on the other hand, can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol
specifications. Both types of adversaries attempt to break either the
correctness or the security property of the protocol. Here we focus on
malicious adversaries.
We consider a three-party setting which comprises a client Ci (one for
each user Ui), a cloud server CS, and a service provider SP. The client
Ci (e.g., a smartphone owned by the user Ui) has a biometric sensor that
extracts biometric templates from the user. We assume that each user’s
On Privacy-Preserving Biometric Authentication 9
client device is not compromised. Since if a client Ci is compromised, then
the reference biometric template of the owner Ui can be easily recovered
using the fresh biometric template provided by the owner [29]. The service
provider SP manages the keys for the employed encryption scheme and
makes the authentication decision. Therefore, we consider the service
provider SP as a trusted protocol actor. However, we do not entrust any
biometric template to the service provider. The malicious actor is the
cloud server CS, which has a database storing the encrypted reference
biometric templates and performs computations on the encrypted fresh and
reference biometric templates. The result of the computation performed
by CS will allow SP to make its decision. In this paper, we exclusively
focus on biometric template privacy and template recovery attacks. Hence,
denial-of-service type of attacks are outside the scope of this paper.
For the communication model, we assume that the communication
channel between the protocol entities are both authentic and secure in the
sense that messages exchanged between two parties cannot be modified
or intercepted by an eavesdropper. This assumption is also necessary for
avoiding replay attacks. Such a communication channel can be established
by using TLS or IPsec between the protocol participants.
4 A generic protocol
This section presents a generic protocol that combines verifiable compu-
tation with an homomorphic encryption. The protocol also employs a
collision resistant cryptographic hash function H : t0, 1u‹ ÞÑ t0, 1un (in
our security analysis, we regard H as a random oracle). To differentiate
from the database DB on the cloud server side, we use db to denote the
database on the service provider side. We call the generic protocol PPBA
which comprises the following.
– Enroll: The user enrollment phase is depicted in Fig. 1. The service
provider SP chooses a collision resistant cryptographic hash func-
tion H and runs the key generation algorithm KeyGen for the HE
and VC schemes using a security parameter λ and the function f to
be computed by the cloud as input: ppk, skq Ð HE.KeyGenpλq and
pPK,VKq Ð VC.KeyGenpλ, fq. The client Ci requests enrollment by
sending its owner Ui’s identity IDi to SP. SP then maps IDi to an
index i using a process known only to itself. The tuple pi, H, pk, VKq
is sent to Ci, and ppk,PKq to CS. The function f is known to the
protocol actors. After receiving pi, H, pkq, Ci first obtains the reference
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Service Provider SP
Pick a hash function H
Run KeyGenpλ, fq to generate
ppk, skq for HE
pPK,VKq for VC
Service Provider SP Client Ci
iÐ IDi IDiÐÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Get IDi from Ui
pi, VKqÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ Store pi, H, pk, VKq
Service Provider SP Cloud CS
ppk, PKqÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ Store ppk, PKq
Client Ci Cloud CS





ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ Store `i, Encpbiq˘
Client Ci Service Provider SP
ωi “ HpEncpbiqq ωiÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ Store ωi
Fig. 1: The enrollment phase of PPBA.
biometric template bi and encrypts the reference biometric template,
Encpbiq. Ci then provides pi, Encpbiqq to the database DB on the cloud
server side for storage. In addition, Ci sends the hash ωi “ HpEncpbiqq
to SP which stores pi, ωiq in its database db. Locally, Ci stores pi,VKq.
Since it is necessary for security, we assume that user enrollment is
performed in a secure and controlled environment.
– Authen: In this phase, before the user Ui authenticates himself, the
service provider SP authenticates itself to the client Ci and provides
the public key pk for HE and the hash function H to Ci. The au-
thentication of SP is necessary to avoid sending sensitive information
to a malicious party impersonating the legitimate SP. After SP is
authenticated, Ci obtains from its user Ui a fresh biometric template
b1i and an identity IDi, and provides Encpb1iq and the index i that it
stored during enrollment to the cloud server CS. The cloud then re-
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Client Ci Service Provider SP
RequestÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ
pH, pkqÐÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Authenticate & send pH, pkq
Client Ci Cloud CS





ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ Retrieve Encpbiq using i from DB
Encpbiq, σctiÐÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ σcti Ð Compf,Encpbiq,Encpb1iq, pk,PKq
Client Ci Service Provider SP
cti Ð VerpEncpbiq,Encpb1iq, σcti ,VKq
If cti “K, abort!
Else, compute rωi Ð HpEncpbiqq pIDi, cti, rωiqÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ Extract i from IDi
Retrieve ωi corresp. to i from db
If rωi ‰ ωi, abort!
YES or NOÐÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ If Decpctiq ď τ , send YES
Else, send NO
Fig. 2: The user authentication phase of PPBA.
trieves Encpbiq corresponding to i from its database DB and runs the
computation algorithm σcti Ð CompEncpbiq,Encpb1iq, pk,PKq for the
verifiable computation scheme VC. Note that pk is needed to eval-
uate the function f on Encpbiq and Encpb1iq. The output σcti is an
encoded version of cti “ fpEncpbiq,Encpb1iqq “ EncpDistpbi, b1iqq. Then,
CS sends Encpbiq, σcti back to the client Ci, which runs the verifica-
tion algorithm cti Ð VerpEncpbiq,Encpb1iq, σcti ,VKq. If cti ‰K, then Ci
computes rωi “ HpEncpbiqq and sends pIDi, cti, rωiq to SP; otherwise,
Ci aborts the protocol. Upon receiving pIDi, cti, rωiq from Ci, SP first
extracts i from IDi, retrieves ωi from db and checks whether rωi “ ωi.
Note here that the hash function is used to check whether the cloud
used the correct input, i.e., Encpbiq, to the function f . If rωi “ ωi, then
SP decrypts cti, i.e., Decpctiq “ Dec
`
EncpDistpbi, b1iqq
˘ “ Distpbi, b1iq.
If Distpbi, b1iq ď τ , then it outputs 1 (or YES) meaning that the client
Ci (or the user Ui) is authenticated; otherwise, it outputs 0 (or NO)
meaning that the client Ci (or the user Ui) is not authenticated.
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Remark 1: We note that the problem generation algorithm ProbGen
for the VC scheme is not used above since in our case the public and secret
output of ProbGen algorithm are the same and equal to pEncpbiq,Encpb1iqq.
Remark 2: By requiring the correspondence between an identity and
an index (e.g., IDi Ø i) to be known only to the service provider, we can
prevent a potentially malicious client Ci from impersonating another client
Cj , j ‰ i. If this is not the case, then a misbehaving client, say Ci, can
initiate the authentication phase with an identity IDj , j ‰ i, and index j
and obtain Encpbjq from the cloud CS. Then, Ci aborts the current round
and later authenticates itself as IDj using Encpbjq. Note that this also
guarantees identity privacy against since CS does not know to which user
identity a database entry belongs.
It is straightforward to see that the correctness of the generic protocol
readily follows. The following theorem summarises the security of the
generic protocol PPBA against the malicious cloud server. The proof of
the theorem is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 (Security of PPBA). Let H be a random oracle. Let HE
be an IND-CPA-secure HE scheme and VC a secure VC scheme as defined
in Definition 7. Let A be a malicious cloud server that is PPT. Then the
advantage of A in the game ExpPrivPPBA,Apλ, fq (cf. Section 2.1) is negligible,
i.e., AdvPPBA,Apλ, fq ď neglpλq.
As mentioned in the previous work, the protocols previously proposed
in [1–3] can be enhanced with a suitable verifiable computation scheme to
mitigate the reported attacks in [8, 25,26].
5 Instantiation
Here we discuss an instantiation of the generic protocol using an ‘-linear
message authentication code (MAC), where ‘ is the XOR operation.
A MAC scheme consists of three algorithms pKeyGen,TAG,VRFYq
(associated with a key space, a message space and a tag space). KeyGen,
a key generation algorithm, takes a security parameter λ as input and
outputs a key k (i.e., kÐ KeyGenpλq). TAG, a tag generation algorithm,
takes a message m and a key k as input, and outputs a tag (i.e., t Ð
TAGpm, kq). VRFY, a verification algorithm, takes a message m, a tag t
and a key k as input, and outputs a decision OutMAC (i.e., OutMAC Ð
VRFYpm, t, kq), which is 1 if the message-tag pair pm, tq is valid, and 0
otherwise.
On Privacy-Preserving Biometric Authentication 13
A typical construction of a MAC scheme is via the use of Universal2
(U2) hash functions, see Appendix B for definitions and how U2 hash
functions can be used to construct a MAC scheme. There are constructions
of U2 hash functions that are ‘-linear [30], from which one can construct
an ‘-linear MAC scheme. Note that a MAC scheme is called ‘-linear if
TAGpm1 ‘m2, kq “ TAGpm1, kq ‘ TAGpm2, kq.
Using any HE scheme that enables the evaluation of XOR of two
encrypted bitstrings (e.g., the Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme [21]
which supports this) and an ‘-linear MAC to verify the correctness of
the computation performed by CS, we have the following variation of the
generic protocol presented in the previous section.
– Enroll: The service provider SP runs the key generation algorithm
KeyGen for the HE and MAC schemes using a security parameter λ:
ppk, skq Ð HE.KeyGenpλq and ki Ð MAC.KeyGenpλq. The client Ci
requests for enrollment by sending its owner Ui’s identity IDi to SP,
which then maps IDi to an index i using a process known only to
itself. The tuple pi, pk, kiq is sent to Ci, and pk to CS. After receiving
pi, pk, kiq, Ci first obtains the reference biometric template bi and
encrypts the reference biometric template, Encpbiq. Ci then provides
pi, Encpbiqq to the database DB on the cloud server side for storage. In
addition, Ci sends the tag ti “ TAGpbi, kiq to SP which stores pi, ki, tiq
in its database db. Locally, Ci stores pi, kiq. As before, we assume that
user enrollment is performed in a secure and controlled environment.
– Authen: Again, before the user Ui authenticates himself, the service
provider SP authenticates itself to the client Ci. Then, Ci obtains
from its user Ui a fresh biometric template b1i and an identity IDi, and
provides Encpb1iq and the index i to the cloud server CS. In addition,
Ci computes t1i “ TAGpb1i, kiq and sends pIDi, t1iq to SP . The cloud then
retrieves Encpbiq corresponding to i from its database DB and computes
γi “ Encpbi‘b1iq homomorphically from Encpbiq and Encpb1iq, and sends
pi, γiq to SP . The service provider then extracts i from IDi and checks
if the extracted i and the index received from CS match each other. If
they match, SP continues to retrieves ki and ti corresponding to i from
db, decrypts γi to obtain Čbi ‘ b1i (i.e., Čbi ‘ b1i Ð Decpγiq), and runs the
MAC verification algorithm VRFYpČbi ‘ b1i, ti‘t1i, kiq. If the output from
VRFY is 0, SP rejects the user. Otherwise, SP checks if the Hamming
weight HWpČbi ‘ b1iq ď τ . Note that HWpbi ‘ b1iq “ HDpbi, b1iq, where
HD is the Hamming distance. If this is the case, SP authenticates the
user Ui, otherwise rejects.
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5.1 Security Analysis
The instantiation is slightly different from the generic protocol in that the
correctness of the computation is verified by SP in the instantiation, we
will also present the security proof for the “instantiation” separately.
Definition 8. A MAC scheme is called pQT , QV , t, q-secure (or, -secure,
for short) if no PPT adversary A running in time at most t cannot generate
a valid message-tag pair, even after making QT tag generation queries to
TAG and QV verification queries to VRFY, except with probability .
In any biometric template recovery attack that makes use of the side
channel information (i.e., the authentication result), CS needs to be able
to submit to SP a γ which encrypts a message that passes the MAC verifi-
cation test performed by SP . The -security of the employed MAC scheme
does not allow this to happen. Furthermore, from a rejection response by
SP, CS does not know whether it is due the MAC verification failure or
the mismatch between the fresh and reference biometric templates. Hence,
our instantiation is robust and secure against the malicious CS. Formally,
the following summarises the security of the instantiation.
Theorem 2. Let HE be an IND-CPA-secure HE scheme such that
HE.Encpm1, pkqHE.Encpm2, pkq “ HE.Encpm1 ‘ m2, pkq and MAC an -
secure ‘-linear MAC scheme. Then, the protocol that employs the HE and
MAC schemes is secure against a malicious cloud server.
The proof is given in Appendix C.
6 Summary
Privacy-preserving biometric authentication allows to authenticate users
using their biometrics while preserving the biometric privacy. A natural
approach to building a privacy-preserving biometric authentication proto-
col is the employment of an homomorphic encryption scheme that allows
the computations and the matching process over encrypted biometric data.
There are indeed multiple privacy-preserving biometric authentication pro-
tocols proposed in the literature over the years that rely on homomorphic
encryption (cf. Section 1.1). In this work, we proposed to combine schemes
for verifiable computation with homomorphic encryption to preserve the
biometric privacy in a distributed remote biometric authentication set-
ting comprising clients, a cloud server, and a service provider. A generic
biometric authentication protocol which is secure against a malicious,
as opposed to honest-but-curious, cloud server is presented. Moreover,
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an instantiation is also given using an XOR-linear MAC to verify the
correctness of the computation performed by the cloud.
Acknowledgments. The author would like to thank the anonymous
reviewers for their helpful comments. This work was supported by the
European Commission through the SECURITY programme under FP7-
SEC-2013-1-607049 EKSISTENZ.
References
1. Bringer, J., Chabanne, H., Izabache`ne, M., Pointcheval, D., Tang, Q., Zimmer, S.:
An application of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem to biometric authentication.
In: ACISP 2007. Volume 4586 of LNCS., Springer (2007) 96–106
2. Yasuda et al., M.: Packed homomorphic encryption based on ideal lattices and its
application to biometrics. In: Security Engineering and Intelligence Informatics.
Volume 8128 of LNCS. (2013) 55–74
3. Yasuda et al., M.: Practical packing method in somewhat homomorphic encryption.
In: DPM/SETOP. Volume 8147 of LNCS. (2013) 34–50
4. Barbosa, M., Brouard, T., Cauchie, S., de Sousa, S.M.: Secure biometric authenti-
cation with improved accuracy. In: ACISP 2008. Volume 5107 of LNCS., Springer
(2008) 21–36
5. Erkin, Z., Franz, M., Guajardo, J., Katzenbeisser, S., Lagendijk, I., Toft, T.:
Privacy-preserving face recognition. In: PETS 2009. (2009) 235–253
6. Sadeghi, A.R., Schneider, T., Wehrenberg, I.: Efficient privacy-preserving face
recognition. In: ICISC 2009. LNCS (2009) 229–244
7. Huang, Y., Malka, L., Evans, D., Katz, J.: Efficient privacy-preserving biometric
identification. In: NDSS. (2011)
8. Abidin, A., Mitrokotsa, A.: Security aspects of privacy-preserving biometric au-
thentication based on ideal lattices and ring-lwe. In: Proceedings of the IEEE
Workshop on Information Forensics and Security. (2014) 1653–1658
9. Gennaro, R., Gentry, C., Parno, B.: Non-interactive verifiable computing: Out-
sourcing computation to untrusted workers. In: CRYPTO 2010. LNCS (2010)
465–482
10. Chung, K.M., Kalai, Y.T., Vadhan, S.P.: Improved delegation of computation using
fully homomorphic encryption. In: CRYPTO 2010. LNCS (2010) 483–501
11. Benabbas, S., Gennaro, R., Vahlis, Y.: Verifiable delegation of computation over
large datasets. In: CRYPTO 2011. Volume 6841 of LNCS. (2011) 111–131
12. Backes, M., Fiore, D., Reischuk, R.M.: Verifiable delegation of computation on
outsourced data. In: ACM CCS 2013, ACM (2013) 863–874
13. Setty, S.T., McPherson, R., Blumberg, A.J., Walfish, M.: Making argument systems
for outsourced computation practical (sometimes). In: NDSS 2012. (2012)
14. Zhang, L.F., Safavi-Naini, R.: Batch verifiable computation of outsourced functions.
Designs, Codes and Cryptography (2015) 1–23
15. Papamanthou, C., Shi, E., Tamassia, R.: Signatures of correct computation. In:
TCC 2013. LNCS (2013) 222–242
16. Rabin, M.O.: How to exchange secrets with oblivious transfer. IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive 2005 (2005) 187
16 Aysajan Abidin
17. Yao, A.C.C.: How to generate and exchange secrets. In: Foundations of Computer
Science, 1986., 27th Annual Symposium on, IEEE (1986) 162–167
18. Chor, B., Kushilevitz, E., Goldreich, O., Sudan, M.: Private information retrieval.
Journal of the ACM 45(6) (1998) 965–981
19. Ostrovsky, R., Willian E. Skeith, I.: A survey of single-database private information
retrieval: techniques and applications. In: PKC’07. LNCS, Springer (2007) 393–411
20. Paillier, P.: Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes.
In: EUROCRYPT 1999. Volume 1592 of LNCS. (1999) 223–238
21. Goldwasser, S., Micali, S.: Probabilistic encryption & how to play mental poker
keeping secret all partial information. In: Proceedings of the fourteenth annual
ACM symposium on Theory of computing. STOC 1982, ACM (1982) 365–377
22. Damg˚ard, I., Geisler, M., Krøigaard: Efficient and secure comparison for on-line
auctions. In: ACISP 2007. Volume 4586 of LNCS., Springer (2007) 416–430
23. Osadchy, M., Pinkas, B., Jarrous, A., Moskovich, B.: SCiFI - A System for Secure
Face Identification. In: IEEE S&P 2010. (May 2010) 239–254
24. Simoens, K., Bringer, J., Chabanne, H., Seys, S.: A framework for analyzing template
security and privacy in biometric authentication systems. IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security 7(2) (2012) 833–841
25. Abidin, A., Matsuura, K., Mitrokotsa, A.: Security of a privacy-preserving biometric
authentication protocol revisited. In: CANS 2014. Volume 8813 of LNCS., Springer
(2014) 290–304
26. Abidin, A., Pagnin, E., Mitrokotsa, A.: Attacks on privacy-preserving biometric
authentication. In: Proceedings of the 19th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems
(NordSec 2014). LNCS, Springer (October 2014) 293–294
27. Bringer, J., Chabanne, H., Patey, A.: SHADE: Secure hamming distance com-
putation from oblivious transfer. In: Financial Cryptography Workshops. (2013)
164–176
28. Bringer, J., Chabanne, H., Favre, M., Patey, A., Schneider, T., Zohner, M.:
GSHADE: Faster Privacy-preserving Distance Computation and Biometric Identi-
fication. In: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Information Hiding and
Multimedia Security, ACM (2014) 187–198
29. Pagnin, E., Dimitrakakis, C., Abidin, A., Mitrokotsa, A.: On the leakage of
information in biometric authentication. In: INDOCRYPT 2014. LNCS, Springer
(2014) 265–280
30. Krawczyk, H.: Lfsr-based hashing and authentication. In Desmedt, Y., ed.:
CRYPTO ’94. Volume 839 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science., Springer 1994
(1994) 129–139
31. Carter, L., Wegman, M.N.: Universal classes of hash functions. J. Comput. Syst.
Sci. 18 (1979) 143–154
32. Stinson, D.R.: Universal hashing and authentication codes. In Feigenbaum, J., ed.:
CRYPTO ’91. Volume 576 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science., Springer 1992
(1991) 74–85
33. Abidin, A., Larsson, J.A˚.: New universal hash functions. In Lucks, S., Armknecht,
F., eds.: WEWoRC 2011. Volume 7242 of LNCS., Springer-Verlag (2012) 99–108
A Proof of Theorem 1
Before we proceed with the proof, let us first analyse the adversarial
scenario in the case of the generic protocol PPBA. Note that by the
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attacker (or the adversary) A, we refer to the malicious cloud server. We
assume that the adversary A has oracle access to Authen, so A can query
Authen with biometric templates and identity of its choice polypλq times,
where λ is a security parameter. In addition, by the security of a privacy-
preserving biometric authentication protocol, we mean the security of the
biometric templates.
Again, we define the security of the protocol PPBA against a malicious
adversary A via the following game played between A and PPBA.
ExpPrivPPBA,Apλ, fq:
ppk, skq, pPK,VKq Ð KeyGenpλ, fq
pIDi, b1i0 , b1i1 q, b1i0 ‰ b1i1 Ð Apλ, pk,PK, fq
β
RÐÝ t0, 1u; Out Ð Authen`IDi, i,Encpb1iβ q˘
β1 Ð A`IDi, b1i0 , b1i1 ,Encpb1iβ q,Out˘
Return 1 if β1 “ β, 0 otherwise
The adversary’s advantage at the end of this game is defined as AdvPrivPPBA,A “ˇˇ
2 PrtExpPrivPPBA,Apλ, fq “ 1u ´ 1
ˇˇ
. We say that the protocol is secure (and
preserves the privacy of biometric templates) against the malicious cloud
server CS, if AdvPrivPPBA,A ď neglpλq.





experiment. Since the authentication process involves the client Ci, the
cloud server CS, and the service provider SP , in the description we write
the entity name followed by a set of inputs it takes in a parenthesis to
denote what that entity takes as input. For instance, CSpi,Encpb1iβ q, pk,PKq
denotes that CS takes i, Encpb1iβ q, and PK as input and performs the






Ci: SPpIDi, cti, rωi, skq:
Send pi,Encpb1iβ qq to CS iÐ IDi
CSpi,Encpb1iβ q, pk,PKq: ωi Ð dbpiq
Encpbiq Ð DBpiq if rωi ‰ ωi then
σcti Ð CompEncpbiq,Encpb1iβ q, pk,PKq Return Out=0








Encpbiq,Encpb1iβ q, σcti ,VK
˘
if Dist ď τ then
if cti “K then Return Out=1
Return Out=0 else
else Return Out=0rωi Ð HpEncpbiqq
Send pIDi, cti, rωiq to SP
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In the authentication process Authen, Out “ 1 is returned in only one
case (i.e., the case where the fresh and the reference biometric templates
match each other), while Out “ 0 is returned in three cases. The three cases
are (1) CS does not perform the correct computation and the verification
algorithm Ver outputs K, (2) CS performs the correct computation but
uses a wrong input, so the integrity check fails, finally (3) there is no
match between the fresh and the reference biometric templates.
Proof (of Theorem 1). We prove this theorem using two games.
game 0: This is the original game. Let S0 be the event that β
1 “ β.
game 1: This is the same as game 0, except that we now replace the
output pEncpbiq, σctiq Ð CSpi,Encpb1iβ q, pk,PKq with the correct Encpbiq
corresponding to i and valid σcti . Let S1 be the event that β
1 “ β in this
game.
Claim 1: |PrtS0u ´ PrtS1u| is negligible.
Proof (of Claim 1). The difference between game 0 and game 1 is that
in game 0 it may happen that cti “K and/or rωi ‰ ωi, while in game 1
these do not happen. While cti “K means winning the game ExpVC,Apλ, fq,rωi ‰ ωi means having a collision in H. So both of these happen with
negligible probability because of the assumption that VC is secure (cf.
Definition 7) and that H is a random oracle. Therefore, the difference
between the winning probabilities in game 0 and game 1 is negligible.
Claim 2:
ˇˇ
2 PrtS1u ´ 1
ˇˇ ď neglpλq.




ˇˇ ą neglpλq. Then we can construct an attacker
A1 that wins in the IND-CPA game against the underlying homomorphic
encryption HE with non-negligible advantage as follows.
ExpIND-CPAHE,A pλq:
ppk, skq Ð KeyGenpλq; pm0,m1q,m0 ‰ m1 Ð A1pλ, pkq
α
RÐÝ t0, 1u; c Ð Encpmα, pkq; Simulate PPBA for A
α1p“ β1q Ð A1`Apm0,m1, c, pkq˘
Return 1 if α1 “ α, 0 otherwise
The attacker A1 obtains the pk for HE, chooses two distinct messages
m0, m1 P ZNqě2, and receives a challenge c “ Encpmαq, where α RÐÝ t0, 1u.
A1 then simulates the protocol execution for PPBA. To simulate PPBA,
A1 uses pk to re-randomise c “ Encpmαq using the homomorphic property
of the encryption, and registers the re-randomised c, let us call it c1, along
with an IDi and a corresponding index i and a hash of c
1 in DB of CS.
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For CS, c and its randomised version c1 are indistinguishable. This does
faithfully simulate the protocol execution for the adversary A, because A1
knows the output of AuthenpIDi, i, cq. Now, if A outputs its guess β1 for β,
then A1 outputs its guess α1p“ β1q for α. Thus, A1 wins if A wins.
Hence, combining Claim 1 and 2, we have that AdvPrivPPBA,A is negligible.
B Universal hash functions
Universal hash functions were first proposed by Carter and Wegman [31] as,
among others, a means to construct unconditionally secure MACs. Stinson
formalised the definitions of Universal hash functions in [32]. Following
these early works, there has been a considerable amount of research done
on Universal hash functions to improve both the description length and
computational performance, see e.g., [33] for a quick overview.
Definition 9 (-ASU2 hash functions [32]). Let M and T be finite
sets. A family F of hash functions from M to T is -ASU2 if the following
two conditions are satisfied: (a) the number of hash functions in F that
takes an arbitrary m1 PM to an arbitrary t1 P T is exactly |F |{|T |; (b)
the fraction of those functions that also takes an arbitrary m2 ‰ m1 in
M to an arbitrary t2 P T (possibly equal to t1) is at most . If  “ 1{|T |,
then F is called SU2.
As can be seen from the definition, -ASU2 hash functions can be
used to construct a MAC scheme in a natural way. More specifically, in
this case a pair of users, say Alice and Bob, share a secret key k which
identifies a hash function hk in a family of -ASU2 hash functions. When
Alice sends a message m to Bob, she also sends t “ hkpmq along with m.
Upon receiving pm, tq, Bob checks the authenticity of m by comparing t
with hkpmq, which he himself computes using his share of the key k. If
hkpmq “ t, then Bob accepts m as authentic; otherwise, he rejects it.
C Proof of Theorem 2
Proof (of Theorem 2). Since the proof is similar to that of the Theorem 1,
we just highlight the differences in the relevant hybrid security games
and the claims. Let PPBA-HE-MAC denote the instantiation. The security
against a malicious adversary A (e.g., CS) is defined via the following
game played between A and PPBA-HE-MAC.
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ExpPrivPPBA-HE-MAC,Apλq:
ppk, skq, MAC.K Ð KeyGenpλq
pIDi, b1i0 , b1i1 q, b1i0 ‰ b1i1 Ð Apλ, pk,MAC.Kq
β
RÐÝ t0, 1u; Out Ð Authen`IDi, i,Encpb1iβ q˘
β1 Ð A`IDi, b1i0 , b1i1 ,Encpb1iβ q,Out˘
Return 1 if β1 “ β, 0 otherwise
where MAC.K is the key space for the employed MAC scheme (e.g.,
the set of U2 hash functions). The adversary’s advantage is defined as
AdvPrivPPBA-HE-MAC,A “
ˇˇ
2 PrtExpPrivPPBA-HE-MAC,Apλq “ 1u´1
ˇˇ
. If AdvPrivPPBA-HE-MAC,A ď
neglpλq, we say that PPBA-HE-MAC is secure (and preserves the privacy
of biometric templates) against A.










Ci sends pi,Encpb1iβ qq to CS
Ci sends pIDi, t1iβ q to SP
CSpi,Encpb1iβ q, pkq:
Encpbiq Ð DBpiq
γi Ð EncpbiqEncpb1iβ q “ Encpbi ‘ b1iβ q
Send pi, γiq to SP
SPpIDi, i, γi, t1iβ , skq:
If i is not the correct index for IDi then
Return Out=0
pki, tiq Ð dbpiq
if ti ‘ t1iβ ‰ TAGpDecpγiq, kiq then
Return Out=0
else




The proof is based on the following two hybrid games.
game 0: This is the original game ExpPrivPPBA-HE-MAC,Apλq. Let S0 be the
event that β1 “ β in game 0.
game 1: This is the same as game 0, except that now CS always performs
the correct computation. Let S1 be the event that β
1 “ β in game 1.
Claim 1: |PrtS0u ´PrtS1u| is negligible. This follows from the -security
of the employed MAC scheme.




ˇˇ ď neglpλq. This follows from the IND-CPA-security of the HE scheme.
Hence, we have that AdvPrivPPBA-HE-MAC,A is negligible.
